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The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles 
and the Technique of "Completing the Analysis" 
Sydney M. CONE, III* 
I. BACKGROUND 
Sea turtles, which are internationally recognized as endangered species threatened 
with extinction, can drown if they are caught in nets used to harvest shrimp. 1 By federal 
statute and implementing regulations, the United States requires that (with certain 
exceptions) shrimp-trawl nets must be equipped with "turtle-excluder devices" designed 
to prevent sea turtles from drowning. The United States not only has imposed this 
requirement on US shrimp-trawl vessels, but has also banned the importation of shrimp 
harvested by foreign vessels that do not meet a similar requirement. 2 The import ban 
gave rise to the Shrimp/Sea Turtles case, in which reports were rendered first by a panel 
and subsequently by the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WT0). 3 
The case arose when four Asian nations,4 invoking the WTO Agreement known 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994,5 disputed the legality of 
the United States applying its regulations to prevent the importation of shrimp from 
those nations. There was no serious doubt that the US ban on shrimp imports violated 
* C. V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. 
1 For the international listing of all seven species of sea turtles as "endangered species" and six of these species 
as threatened with extinction, see the Panel Report (as note 3, below) at II(!) "Basic Facts About Sea Turtles" and 
V "Panel's Consultation With Scientific Experts". 
2 The US Endangered Species Act of 1973 and regulations issued thereunder in 1987 require US shrimp-trawl 
vessels, subject to certain exceptions, to install in their nets sea-turtle-excluder devices (grid trapdoors that pass 
shrimp into a net while directing sea turtles out of the net). In 1989, the United States enacted §609 of Public Law 
101-102, 16 U.S.C. §1537, and in 1991 and 1993 issued Guidelines thereunder, pursuant to which the United States 
effectively banned the importation of shrimp harvested by vessels unless, subject to certain exceptions, they had 
installed sea-turtle-excluder devices in their nets. Initially, the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines applied §609 to only 14 
countries in the Western Hemisphere. In December 1995 and again in April 1996, a US court ordered that §609 be 
applied worldwide. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F.Supp. 559, 579-580 (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade 1995), 992 
F.Supp. 616, 627 (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade 1996). As a result, the United States issued 1996 Guidelines to apply §609 
worldwide. See generally the Panel Report (note 3, below) at 11(2) ("The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) and 
Related Legislation"). The application of §609, including the revision of the 1996 Guidelines on 28 August 1998, 
has continued to be the subject of litigation in the US courts, brought by environmental organizations against the 
US government (see note 15, below). 
-' United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp mtd Shri111p Products, World Trade Organization. Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS58/R (98-1710), 15 May 1998 (hereinafter, the "Panel Report"). Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT /DS58/ AB/R (AB-1998-4), 12 October 1998 (hereinafter, the "Appellate Body Report"). 
4 The complaining parties were India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand. Third-party arguments were submitted 
by the European Union and 10 countries. In addition, two brief< were submitted to the panel by non-governmental 
organizations, one brief by the Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for International Environmental 
Law, the other brief by the World Wide Fund for Nature. The four complaining parties objected to these submissions. 
With the consent of the Panel, the United States designated a portion of the former brief as an annex to one of its 
submissions to the Panel. Panel Report at VII(B). The Appellate Body found that the panel had authority to accept 
submissions by non-governmental organizations. Appellate Body Report at paras 109-110. 
5 GATT 1994, Annex 1A, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations 
(Marrakesh, 15 April 1994). 
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certain provisions of the GATT 1994, 6 and the only significant issue was whether, 
notwithstanding this violation, the US measures were justified by virtue of Article XX 
of the GATT 1994. The relevant provisions are Paragraph (g) of Article XX, under which 
it may be possible to justify the adoption of national environmental measures that restrain 
multilateral trade, and the introductory clause, or chapeau, of Article XX, which subjects 
the application of such measures to certain requirements. 7 
The WTO panel, in its report, analysed the US measures solely under the chapeau 
but not under Paragraph (g), and ruled in favour of the complainant nations on the 
ground that the United States had "taken unilateral measures which, by their nature, 
could put the multilateral trading system at risk". In reaching this conclusion, the Panel 
said that the GATT 1994 "only allows [WTO] Members to derogate from GATT 
pro~isions [here, the GATT provisions that forbid import barriers] so long as they [the 
Members] do not undermine the multilateral trading system ... "; and that a WTO panel, 
when considering a given national measure, "must determine not only whether the 
measure on its own undermines the WTO multilateral trading system, but also whether 
such type of measure, if it were adopted by other Members, would threaten the security 
and predictability of the multilateral trading system" .8 
The Panel Report was appealed to the WTO's Appellate Body which, in its Report, 
rejected what it called "the very broad formulation"-the prohibition of measures that 
'~undermine the WTO multilateral trading system"-on which the Panel had relied. 
According to the Appellate Body: "maintaining, rather than undermining, the multilateral 
trading system is necessarily a fundamental and pervasive premise [of the GATT 1994], 
but it is not a right or an obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule [for applying the 
GATT 1994]".9 
Having rejected the basis for the Panel Report, the Appellate Body reviewed the 
record in the case (at times amplifying that record). It found that the US regulations had 
been fashioned for the legitimate purpose of protecting and conserving sea turtles, and 
that there was a reasonable relationship between the rules requiring that shrimp-trawl 
vessels use sea-turtle-excluder devices "and the legitimate policy of conserving an 
exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species". Thus, according to the Appellate Body, the 
US regulations were authorized by Paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
which permits the adoption of measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources ... " .1° 
As mentioned above, however, measures permitted by Paragraph (g) are subject to the 
requirements of the introductory clause, or chapeau, of Article XX. According to the chapeau, 
measures permitted by Paragraph (g), such as the US sea-turtle-excluder regulations, are: 
1
' The Pmel Report, at VII(C), found that the US import ban was not consistent with Art. XI:! of the GATT 
1994, and 111d1cated that the United States did not contest this finding. 
7 The relevant portions of Art. XX are quoted below. 
" Panel Report, at VIl(E)(2), Chapeau of Artticle XX. 
'' Appellate Body Report, at para. 116. 
111 See note 9, above, at paras 141-142. 
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"[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade ... ". 
On the basis of the Article XX chapeau Gust quoted), the Appellate Body, taking 
up "unjustifiable discrimination" and "arbitrary discrimination" separately (and in that 
order), examined the manner in which the United States had regulated the importation 
of shrimp. 11 The Appellate Body concluded that, although the US import regulations 
constituted a measure serving a legitimate objective under Paragraph (g) of Article XX 
of the GATT 1994, "this measure has been applied by the United States in a manner 
which cons.titutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the 
WTO, contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX". 12 
Summarized below as "first" to "fifth" are the principal findings by the Appellate 
Body in respect of application by the United States of its import regulations. (The 
numbering, sequence and content of the summaries found below are the author's, not 
the Appellate Body's.) 
The Appellate Body's finding of"arbitrary discrimination" rested on a single finding: 
- First, that the United States had failed to adopt a transparent process whereby 
countries could apply for and obtain certification that they were acting in 
conformity with the US regulations. u 
Findings "second" to "fifth", "considered in their cumulative effect", led to the 
Appellate Body's finding of "unjustifiable discrimination". 14 They were: 
- Second, while the Shrimp/Sea 1i;rtles case was pending before the WTO panel 
and Appellate Body, the United States had banned from its market shrimp harvested 
in the waters of nations that did not have programmes for their shrimp-trawl 
vessels similar to the programme applied by the United States to its vessels, even 
when the shrimp had been harvested by particular vessels that used sea-turtle-
excluder devices in their nets. 15 
11 See note 9, above, at paras 1(,3-176 ("unjustifiable discrimination"), 180-181 ("arbitrary discrimination"). 
12 See note 9, above, at para. 186. 
u See note 9, above, at paras 177-184. Here the Appellate Body relied on oral statements made at a hearing 
held by it. As there is no public record of these statements, the basis for the finding as to lack of transparency is itself 
somewhat lacking in transparency. 
1• See note 9, above, at para. 176. 
15 See note 9, above, at para. 165. In the US litigation rcfrrred to in note 2, above, environmental groups 
expressed concern that, if a nation limited its use of sea-turtle-excluder devices to its shrimp-trawl vessels supplying 
the US market, the rest of that nation's shrimp-trawl vessels, freed of any obligation to use the devices, could dfrctively 
subject all turtles in the region to the risk of being drowned. Emh Js/a11d /11stit11tc IJ. Christopher, 942 F:Supp. 597, 
604-606 (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade 19%), 948 F:Supp. 1062, 1064 (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade 1996). This concern was repeated 
in oral argument on 14 December 1998 in Earth Js/a11d lnstit11tc JJ. Afhr(~ht (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade, Docket No. 
98-09-02818), when plaintiffs, attacking the 28 August 1998 revision of the US Guidelines (sec note 2, above), 
asserted (1) that in a particular nation's waters all shrimp-trawl vessels tend to be vessels of that nation, and (2) the 
US government, by certifying shrimp imports on a vessel-specific or shipment-by-shipment basis from a nation that 
does not have a sea-turtle-protection programme certified by the United States, could validate that nation\ use of 
sea-turtle-excluder devices being limited to specific vessels, while the other vessels of that nation were at liberty to 
drown sea turtles by using trawl nets lacking excluder devices. 
54 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 
- Third, in determining whether a country would be permitted to export shrimp 
to the United States, US officials did not take account of all of the policies and 
measures that the exporting country may have adopted for the protection of sea 
turtles, and looked only to see whether that country's regulatory programme was 
essentially the same as the programme applied by the United States to its own 
shrimp-trawl vessels. 16 
- Fourth, although the United States had entered into an agreement with certain 
nations (not including the complainant nations) to implement programmes for 
the use of sea-turtle-excluder devices, the United States had not entered into 
"serious" negotiations with the complainant nations "with the objective of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation 
of sea turtles ... ". 17 
Fifth, the United States had given some nations three years to phase in the adoption 
of programmes for using sea-turtle-excluder devices, and had assisted them in 
achieving compliance, but had given the complainant nations only four months 
in which to adopt such programmes, and had not afforded them the same level 
of assistance. 18 
The Appellate Body's Report is analysed below from three perspectives: 
- its implications for the US environmental regulations there at issue; 
- its broader implications for Appellate Body review of Reports by WTO Panels; 
and 
- its still broader implications for Reports by WTO Panels or the Appellate Body 
that impinge on, or are impinged on by, national environmental policies or 
programmes whose primary focus is not world trade. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR US EFFORTS TO PROTECT SEA TURTLES 
Indicating its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings found in 
the Appellate Body's Report, the United States has said that compliance "will require a 
'reasonable period of time"' within the meaning of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), 19 and has further said: "We will implement [the Report] in a 
manner which is consistent not only with our WTO obligations but also with our firm 
commitment to the protection of endangered species, including sea turtles" .20 
1
'' Sec note 9, ahove, at para. 163. 
17 See note 9, ahove, at paras 166-167 and 171-172. References to "serious" negotiations are found in paras 
166, 167and171, and to negotiating "seriously" in para. 172. Apparently the only multilateral agreement on protecting 
and conscrvmg sea turtles that to date has actually been entered into is the Inter-American Convention on the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, concluded in 1996. 
18 See note 9, above, at paras 173-175. 
1
'' Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round Negotiations (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994). Art. 21 (3) thereof defines a "reasonable 
period of time" for compliance with a Panel or Appellate Body Report. 
20 United States Trade Representative, "Talking Points Regarding U.S. Intentions Regarding the Shrimp-Turtle 
Dispute", 24 November 1998. 
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The Appellate Body's finding "first" seems to suggest that the United States could 
comply promptly with that finding by adopting pertinent administrative procedures that 
are appropriately transparent from the perspective of applicants for US certification. Were 
this to be done, the US regulations would cease to constitute "arbitrary discrimination" 
within the meaning of the Article XX chapeau as interpreted by the Appellate Body. 21 
As regards the finding "second", it would seem that the United States is already in 
compliance as the result of its amendment, on 28 August 1998, of the applicable US 
regulations.22 Prior to this amendment, exports of shrimp to the United States from a 
foreign country had been banned unless the exporting country had adopted a 
comprehensive programme, certified by the United States, for the use of sea-turtle-excluder 
devices. Subsequent to this amendment, the United States is to evaluate separately each 
shipment from an exporting country that does not have such a comprehensive programme 
and, if the relevant shrimp-trawl vessel(s) in respect of a particular shipment used 
sea-turtle-excluder devices, the US importation of that shipment is to be permitted.23 
(Related questions involving finding "second" itself are discussed in section III., below. 24) 
Findings "third" and "fourth", respectively, would have the United States take account 
of the entirety of an exporting country's efforts to protect and conserve sea turtles, and 
make "serious" efforts to enter into agreements on sea-turtle protection and conservation 
with the complainant nations (and, possibly, other nations with which the United States 
has not yet concluded such agreements). As a practical matter, finding "third" might be 
subsumed under finding "fourth", that is the former might be an element in the negotiation 
of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to the protection and conservation of sea 
turtles. 
Obviously, the negotiation of an agreement is a two-party or multi-party process, 
and each party may have its own ideas as to what constitutes "serious" efforts at negotiation. 
In the background, there may be conflicting factors. In particular, sea turtles face extinction, 
and delays in negotiation will be unlikely to work in their favour or in the favour of 
those seeking to protect and conserve them. On the other hand, national measures taken 
to protect sea turtles can also have the effect of protecting national markets for shrimp. 
The opening or closing of the US market for shrimp to one or more other nations may 
have commercial consequences that are not necessarily related to protecting or conserving 
sea turtles. Although it may not be self-evident when efforts at negotiation are "serious", 
there is an existing international agreement on sea-turtle protection that might provide 
some guidance in this connection.25 
Finally, there is finding "fifth"-that the United States should afford the complainant 
nations additional time in which to comply with the US regulations, and should offer 
21 See the text at note 13, above. 
22 See note 2, above, final sentence. 
23 As mentioned in note 15, above, this approach to import certification has been challenged by US environmental 
organizations. 
24 See the sixth and seventh paras of text under section Ill, below. 
25 See note 17, above. 
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them additional assistance to enable them to do so. This finding addresses the fact that, 
as regards these factors of phase-in time and assistance, the United States had treated the 
Asian complainants less favourably than it had treated certain Western Hemisphere 
countries. Whatever the merits of this finding, the fact of discriminatory treatment in 
the past may be difficult to redress in the present. A grant of additional time and 
appropriations by the US Congress may be simply unattainable in the context of prompt 
and "serious" negotiations designed to reach fruition within a "reasonable period of 
time". Since the Appellate 13ody, in its analysis of "unjustifiable discrimination" within 
the meaning of the Article XX chapeau, referred to the "cumulative effect" of its findings 
"second" to "fifth" ,2r, it might be argued that US compliance with findings "second" to 
"fourth" would so diminish the "cumulative effect" as to constitute compliance with the 
Appellate Body's Report. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF PANEL REPORTS BY THE APPELLATE 13orw 
Under the DSU, the Appellate 13ody, in considering a Panel Report on appeal, is 
supposed to review only issues of law; and does not have authority to remand the case 
to the panel for further proceedings in light of the Appellate 13ody's rulings on issues of 
law.27 Faced with the dilemma posed by these procedural constraints, on the one hand, 
and the overriding DSU objective of resolving cases rapidly,28 on the other, the Appellate 
Body, rather than leave a case unresolved when it disagrees with a Panel R.eport, has 
developed a technique whereby it undertakes to "complete the analysis" found in the 
Panel Report (i.e. to act de noFo as though it were itself a panel) and then, on the basis of 
the "analysis" thus "completed", to resume acting as the Appellate 13ody and reach 
definitive legal conclusions. 29 This is the technique that it employed in the Shrimp/Sea 
1urtles case. 
The technique of "completing the analysis" exists outside the provisions set forth 
in the DSU. It is purely a case-law creation of the Appellate Body. Its justification is that, 
without this technique, the Appellate Body, subject to the procedural constraints mentioned 
above, would be unable to resolve a case as to which it agreed generally with the result 
reached by the Panel, but disagreed with some or much of the factual or legal analysis 
on which the Panel relied to reach that general result. 
To date, the Appellate 13ody has not ruled on a case where it disagreed altogether 
with a Panel Report. Thus, the technique of"completing the analysis" has yet to be used 
by the Appellate 13ody in a case where, for example, it concludes that the party prevailing 
before the Panel should not have prevailed on any grounds whatsoever. As a matter of 
logic, however, the Appellate Body, were it so inclined, could extend the technique to 
2<· See note 14 ~md acco111panying text, above. 
n DSU, Art. 17(6). 
" DSU, Art. 17(5). 
2
'' See the Appellate Body Report, at paras 123-124. See also Cone, T/ic Appellate Body and Harrows111irh Co1111try 
Li{c,32JWT 103, 113-115 (April 1998). 
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cover such a case. "Completing the analysis" is already a euphemism for rejecting some 
or much of the Panel's analysis. Carried to its logical limits, the technique would provide 
the Appellate Body with a procedure for deciding a case by substantially rejecting the 
Report of the Panel being considered on appeal, and then substituting its own Report 
that reflected its assumed dual role of both panel and Appellate Body. 
The Shrimp/Sea Ti1rtles case is not what might be called the ultimate exercise in 
analysis-completion, for the Appellate Body did not "complete the analysis" to the point 
that it threw out the Panel's work in its totality. The case can, however, be said to represent 
a major step toward the ultimate exercise in analysis-completion, in light of the following: 
the Appellate Body (unlike the Panel) recognized the environmental and WTO legitimacy 
of the US regulations under Paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994, and then 
rejected the Panel's "very broad formulation" (cast in terms of "the WTO multilateral 
trading system") for applying the Article XX chapeau, and the Panel's finding of (in 
effect) a per se violation of the chapeau, as set forth in the Panel's conclusion that the 
United States had "taken unilateral measures which, by their nature, could put the 
multilateral trading system at risk";30 that having been done, the Appellate Body (again 
unlike the Panel) seemed to put the US regulations within striking distance of conformity 
with the Article XX chapeau-if the United States were to modify five aspects of the 
application of those regulations. 31 
Notwithstanding these differences between the Appellate Body and the Panel, there 
are portions of the Appellate Body's Report, especially its findings "second" and "third", 
where the analysis, or lack of analysis, fails to provide an explanation for the finding that 
the United States engaged in "unjustifiable discrimination" within the meaning of the 
Article XX chapeau. By default, the Appellate Body's rationale in these instances seems 
to be that of the Panel, namely that the measures taken by the United States were not in 
conformity with the chapeau because they were unilateral measures undermining the 
multilateral trading system. More specifically, these are instances where the Appellate 
Body seems to have lost sight of its own statement concerning legitimate environmental 
policy-of its observation that there is a reasonable relationship between the US rules 
requiring shrimp-trawl vessels to use sea-turtle-excluder devices "and the legitimate 
policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species". 32 
This analytical lapse is most striking in finding "second". From an environmental 
perspective, the issue here would seem to call for more than the conclusory language 
used by the Appellate Body in its finding of "unjustifiable discrimination". The issue 
turns on two quite different ways in which the United States might regulate the 
importation of shrimp. Under one approach, the United States permits shrimp to be 
imported from a foreign country only if that country has adopted a general programme 
for the use of sea-turtle-exclusion devices. Under the other approach, the United States 
30 See note 9, above, at paras 115-1lo;121-122. 
31 See the discussion of findings "first" to "fifth" above under section II, above. 
"
2 See the text at note 10, above. 
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takes account of the specific vessels of that country that caught the shrimp being exported 
and, if those particular vessels used such devices, permits the importation of the shrimp. 
Without explaining how it reached its conclusion, the Appellate Body indicated that the 
first approach constitutes "unjustifiable discrimination" whereas the second approach 
does not.33 
The environmental implications of this distinction-implications that have been the 
subject of litigation in US courts between environmental organizations and the federal 
government34-were not examined by the Appellate Body in the context of its finding 
"second". In particular, the Appellate Body ignored the difficult question of whether 
vessel-specific (as opposed to country-by-country) enforcement of the US regulations 
would be too limited to achieve "the legitimate policy of conserving [sea turtles]". To 
this extent, the Appellate Body's exercise in "completing the analysis" of the Panel was 
in turn in need of analysis-completion. 
Finding "third" is also framed in conclusory terms. It finds "unjustifiable 
discrimination" because the United States, in evaluating other countries' sea-turtle-
protection programmes, measured them against its own programme. Analytically, a step 
is missing, that is to explain why, on the facts, the US programme is not an acceptable 
standard against which to measure other programmes in the context of achieving "the 
legitimate policy of conserving [sea turtles]".:is Here again, the Appellate Body's technique 
of analysis-completion added little to the Panel's rationale that US unilateralism threatened 
the multilateral trading system. 
Even so, the Appellate Body was hardly at pains to treat the Panel's Report as a 
fundament for its own. The Panel's Report became a mere ingredient to be skinned and 
skimmed and then skewered into the Appellate Body's Report.3(' Thus, the Shrimp/Sea 
'Ii1rtles case may prove to have been more than a major step toward the ultimate exercise 
in analysis-completion. It may turn out to be a jurisprudential milestone marking the 
WTO's seeming tendency to move away from the original DSU design for dispute 
settlement through panels with occasional, limited appellate review,37 and to move toward 
a dispute-settlement system in which the Appellate Body acts as the WTO's judicial 
suzerain. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The Shrimp/Sea Iiirtles case embodied a collision between national environmental 
law and multilateral trade law. US regulations which had been adopted for the purposes 
l.l See note 9, above, at para. 165. 
'4 Sec note 15, above. 
15 The issue of employing the US programme as the standard for other nations has arisen in the litigation 
mentioned in notes 2 and 15, above. See Earth Island fostit11tc 11. Christopher, 913 FSupp. 559, 578-579 (U.S. Ct. Int'! 
Trade 1995), 942 FSupp. 597, 604-606 (U.S. Ct. Int'! Trade 1996). 
"' This treatment of the Panel Report is manifest in the Appellate Body Report, at paras 114-122. 
37 The functioning of Panels and the adoption of Panel Reports arc dealt with extensively in the DSU as 
though appellate review would be infrequent. See the DSU, Arts 6-16, and Appendix 3. 
THE APPELLATE BODY, SEA TURTLES AND "COMPLETING THE ANALYSIS" 59 
of environmental protection collided with the WTO legal regime. The Appellate Body 
that dealt with this collision functions within the WTO and has a mandate conceived 
primarily in terms of world trade, and only incidentally to take account of environmental 
matters. 
Reports by the Appellate 13ody (such as its Report in the Shrimp/Sea Turtles case) 
must be prepared in conformity with a strict procedural timetable found in the DSU. 38 
Under the DSU, moreover, an Appellate Body Report must be adopted by the member 
countries of the WTO, sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body (DS13), unless, by unanimous 
vote, the DSB decides not to adopt the Report. 39 As (at the least) the prevailing parties 
to a. dispute can be expected to vote to adopt a Report issued in their favour, the DS13 
(a rather cumbersome body of well over 100 countries) has no effective way of modifying 
or rejecting an Appellate Body Report. In sum, Reports by the Appellate Body are 
prepared by it under strict time constraints, and are then adopted by the DSB in a process 
that is virtually automatic. 
The process is efficient. It spares the Appellate Body any serious concerns about 
plenary debates or contentious review within the unwieldy DSI3. The Appellate Body 
need not burden itself with jurisdictional issues other than the pertinent terms of reference 
of the cases before it, as prescribed under the DSU. Parallel proceedings are unlikely to 
arise outside the WTO, and no authority exists outside the WTO to review Appellate 
Body Reports. On the other hand, as in the Shrimp/Sea Turtles case, this efficient process 
runs the risk of taking the Appellate Body and, through it, the WTO into areas where 
world trade policies conflict with policies or programmes whose primary focus is not 
world trade. 
In the Shrimp/Sea Turtles case, the Appellate Body was quite mindful that the dispute 
before it involved a clash between national environmental policy and multilateral trade 
policy. 40 To moderate this clash, it had at hand the technique of"analysis completion," 
and it applied the technique with considerable boldness. At times, however, particularly 
in its findings "second" and "third", the Appellate Body seems to have lost sight of the 
environmental complexities of the case. 41 It seems fair to say that the Appellate Body did 
not provide the parties with a formula for resolving their differences, but in effect called 
on them to attempt to resolve those differences through "serious" negotiations looking 
toward a WTO-compatible agreement on the environmental issues presented by the 
endangered species of sea turtles. 42 
Thus far in the WTO proceedings in this case, the essential principles of free trade 
have not been prejudiced. At the same time, legitimate national interests relating to the 
environment have been recognized. Normally, under the DSU, the complainant nations 
38 
"As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed CiO days from the date a party to the dispute formally 
notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report .... In no case shall the proceedings 
exceed 90 days." (DSU, Art. 17(5).) 
'" DSU,Art. 17(14). 
40 See note 9, above, at paras 152-155 and 185. 
41 See the seventh and eighth paras of section III, above. 
42 See note 17, above. 
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can insist on US compliance with the Appellate Body's Report within 15 months. 43 
Thus, they and the United States may have been given an opportunity promptly to resolve 
the conflict to their mutual satisfaction. 
If the result is a negotiated solution serving both free trade in shrimp and the 
protection and conservation of sea turtles, then the Appellate Body's bold use of"analysis 
completion" will have been rewarded. If, however, negotiations founder (on, for example, 
the issue of worldwide adoption of sea-turtle-exclusion devices), the WTO may be called 
upon to decide whether "serious" negotiations have in fact been undertaken. In this 
event, one can hypothesize that the complainant nations will assert that the United States 
is "serious" only about protecting its shrimp market from their exports through 
unreasonable environmental regulations; and that the United States will protest that the 
complainant nations are environmental "free riders", seeking access to the US market 
while avoiding the burden of a meaningful environmental programme to protect sea 
turtles from drowning in shrimp-trawl nets. Rival claims along these lines might prove 
intractable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the Shrimp/Sea Turtles case, the Appellate Body has taken the technique of"analysis 
completion" to a new level of judicial activism. Robust resort to this technique may have 
been necessary in order to give the parties an opportunity to settle their differences. It is 
difficult to see how the Appellate Body could itself have fashioned a satisfactory resolution 
of a conflict that so starkly opposes the forces of free trade and the environment. Inherent 
in the conflict is the risk that the parties will eventually reach an impasse, in which case 
the skill and authority of the Appellate Body could be oflittle avail. 
The authority of the Appellate Body rests on the somewhat fortuitous circumstance 
that it is a multilateral judicial tribunal untrammelled by effective review from within or 
outside of the WTO. Consequently, even if the Appellate Body technically confines itself 
to applying the WTO agreements, it is in a position to bring those agreements to bear 
on the national environmental laws of sovereign nations. Thus empowered, the Appellate 
Body is both the beneficiary and the victim of its own lopsided power. It acts in the 
absence of a legislative counterpart. When there is no multilateral legislature to address 
environmental problems, timely multilateral solutions to those problems may not be 
available. National legislatures may feel called upon to attempt to cope with the problems 
in the absence of multilateral agreement. Meanwhile, the negotiation of a multilateral 
agreement on a given environmental measure may have to wait until, following protracted 
discussions and the exaction of a multitude of concessions, every potential national dissent 
of consequence has been eliminated and a consensus has been reached on how to reconcile 
particular trade and environmental objectives. 
Given these realities, it would have been imprudent for the Appellate Body to adopt 
43 DSU, Art. 21 (3)(c). 
THE Al'l'bLLATE BUDY, SEA TUl'lTLES .AN! l "COMl'Ll'TINC: THI· AN1\I YSIS" (l 1 
an approach othn than that taken in its Report in the' S/11/111r!.'i'rn 'Iitrtlcs c1sc. It i.s for 
the WTO member countrie's themselves to appreciate that, in sm:h a case. the Appellate 
Body, even acting as the judicial suzerain of the WT'(), may be able to do little more' th,m 
give them an opportunity to resolve their disputes through "serious" negotiations. 
